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ABSTRACT
Image classifiers often suffer from adversarial examples, which
are generated by strategically adding a small amount of noise to
input images to trick classifiers into misclassification. Over the
years, many defense mechanisms have been proposed, and differ-
ent researchers have made seemingly contradictory claims on their
effectiveness. We present an analysis of possible adversarial mod-
els, and propose an evaluation framework for comparing different
defense mechanisms. As part of the framework, we introduced a
more powerful and realistic adversary strategy. We propose a new
defense mechanism called Random Spiking (RS), which generalizes
dropout and introduces random noises in the training process in
a controlled manner. Evaluations under our proposed framework
suggest RS delivers better protection against adversarial examples
than many existing schemes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern society increasingly relies on software systems trained by
machine learning (ML) techniques. Many such techniques, how-
ever, were designed under the implicit assumption that both the
training and test data follow the same static (although possibly un-
known) distribution. In the presence of intelligent and resourceful
adversaries, this assumption no longer holds. Such an adversary
can deliberately manipulate a test instance, and cause the trained
models to behave unexpectedly. For example, it is found that exist-
ing image classifiers based on Deep Neural Networks are highly
vulnerable to adversarial examples [16, 33]. Often times, by modi-
fying an image in a way that is barely noticeable by humans, the
classifier will confidently classify it as something else. This phe-
nomenon also exists for classifiers that do not use neural networks,
and has been called “optical illusions for machines”. Understanding
why adversarial examples work and how to defend against them is
becoming increasingly important, as machine learning techniques
are used ubiquitously, for example, in transformative technologies
such as autonomous cars, unmanned aerial vehicles, and so on.
Many approaches have been proposed to help defend against
adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al. [33] proposed adversarial
training, in which one trains a neural network using both the origi-
nal training dataset and the newly generated adversarial examples.
In region-based classification [6], one aggregates predictions on
multiple perturbed versions of an input instance to make predic-
tion. Some approaches attempt to train additional neural network
models to identify and reject adversarial examples [24, 40].
We point out that since the adversary can choose instances
and shift the test distribution after a model is trained, adversary
examples exist so long as ML models differ from human perception
on some instances. (These instances can be used as adversarial
examples.) Thus adversarial examples are unlikely to be completely
eliminated. What we can do is to reduce such instances by training
ML models that better match human perceptions, and by making it
more difficult for the attacker to find adversarial examples.
While the research community has seen a proliferation in propos-
als of defense mechanisms, conducting a thorough evaluation and
a fair head-to-head comparison of different mechanisms remains
challenging. In Section 3, we analyze possible adversarial models,
and propose to conduct evaluation in a variety of models, including
both white-box and translucent-box attacks. In translucent-box at-
tacks, the adversary is assumed to know the defense mechanism,
model architecture, and distribution of training data, but not the
precise parameters of the target model. With this knowledge, the ad-
versary can train one or more surrogate models, and to generate
adversarial examples leveraging such surrogate models.
While other research efforts have attempted to generate adver-
sarial examples based on surrogate models and then assess transfer-
ability, existing application of this method does not fully exploit the
potential of surrogate models. As a result, one can overestimate the
effectiveness of defenses. We propose two improvements. First, one
can train many surrogate models under the same configuration, and
then generate adversarial examples that can simultaneously fool
multiple surrogate models at the same time. Second, one can reserve
some surrogate models as “validation models”. These validation
models are not used when generating adversarial examples; how-
ever, generated adversarial examples are first run against them, and
only those examples that are able to fool a certain percentage of the
validation models are used in evaluation against the target model.
This models a more determined and resourceful attacker who is
willing to spend more resources to find more effective adversarial
examples to deploy, a scenario that is certainly realistic. Our experi-
mental results demonstrate that these more sophisticated adversary
strategies lead to significantly higher transferability rates.
Furthermore, in Section 4, we propose a new defense mechanism
called Random Spiking, where random noises are added to one or
more hidden layers during training. Random Spiking generalizes
the idea of dropout [30], where hidden units are randomly dropped
during training. In Random Spiking, the outputs of some randomly
chosen units are replaced by a random noise during training.
In Section 5, we present extensive evaluations of several ex-
isting defense mechanisms and Random Spiking (RS) under both
white-box and translucent-box attacks, and empirically show that
RS, especially when combined with adversarial training, improve
the resiliency against adversarial examples.
In summary, we make three contributions. (1) The proposed
evaluation methodology, especially the more powerful and realistic
adversary strategy of attacking multiple surrogates in parallel and
using validation models to filter. (2) The idea of Random Spiking,
which is demonstrated to offer additional resistance to adversarial
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examples. (3) We provide a thorough evaluation of several defense
mechanisms against adversarial examples, improving our under-
standing of them.
2 BACKGROUND
We consider neural networks that are used asm-class classifiers,
where the output of a network is computed using the softmax func-
tion. Given such a neural network used for classification, let z(x)
denote the vector output of the final layer before the softmax acti-
vation, andC(x) denote the classifier defined by the neural network.
Then,
C(x) = argmax
i
(
exp(z(x)i )
/ ( ∑n
j=1 exp(z(x)j )
) )
.
Oftentimes, exp(z(x)i )
/ ( ∑n
j=1 exp(z(x)j
)
is interpreted as the prob-
ability that the input x belongs to the i-th category, and the classifier
chooses the class with the highest probability. Under this interpre-
tation, the output z(x) is related to log of odds ratios, and is thus
called the logits output.
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Given a dataset D of instances, each of the form (x ,y), where x
gives the features of the instance, and y the label, and a classifier
C(·) trained using a subset of D, we say that an instance x ′ is
an adversarial example if and only if there exists an instance
(x ,y) ∈ D such that x ′ is close to x , C(x) = y, and C(x ′) , y.
Note that in the above we did not define what “x ′ is close to x”
means. Intuitively, when x represents an image, by closeness we
mean human perceptual similarity. However, we are unaware of
any mathematical distance metric that accurately measures human
perceptual similarity. In the literature Lp norms are often used as
the distance metric for closeness. Lp is defined as
Lp (x ,x ′) = ∥x − x ′∥p =
( ∑n
i=1 |xi − x ′i |p
)1/p
.
The commonly used Lp metrics include: L0, the number of changed
pixels [26]; L1, the sum of absolute values of the changes in all pixels
[13]; L2, the Euclidean norm [9, 11, 25, 33]; and L∞, the maximum
absolute change [16]. In this paper, we use L2, which reflects both
the number of changed pixels and the magnitude of their change.
We call L2(x ,x ′) the distortion of the adversarial example x ′.
When generating an adversarial example against a classifierC(·),
one typically starts from an existing instance (x ,y) and generates
x ′. In an untargeted attack, one generates x ′ such thatC(x ′) , y.
In a targeted attack, one has a desired target label t , y and
generates x ′ such that C(x ′) = t .
Goodfellow et al. [16] proposed the fast gradient sign (FGS)
attack, which generates adversarial examples based on the gradient
sign of the loss value according to the input image. A more effective
attack is proposed by Carlini and Wagner [9], which we call the
C&W attack. Given a neural network with logits output z, an input
x , and a target class label t , the C&W attack tries to solve the
following optimization problem:
argmin
x ′
(∥x − x ′∥p + c · l(x ′)) (1)
where the loss function l is defined as
l(x ′) = max (max {z(x ′)i : i , t} − z(x ′)t ,−K ) .
Here, K is called the confidence value, and is a positive number
that one can choose. Intuitively, we desire z(x ′)t to be higher than
any z(x ′)i where i , t so that the neural network predicts label
t on input x ′. Furthermore, we prefer the gap in the logit of the
class t and the highest of any class other than t to be as large as
possible (until the gap is K , at which point we consider the gap to
be sufficiently large). In general, choosing a large value K would
result in adversarial examples that have a higher distortion, but
will be classified to the desired label with higher confidence. The
parameter c > 0 in Eq. (1) is a regularization constant to adjust the
relative importance of minimizing the distortion versus minimizing
the loss function l . In the attack, c is initially set to a small initial
value, and then dynamically adjusted based on the progress made
by the iterative optimization process.
The C&W attack uses the Adam algorithm [19] to solve the
optimization problem in Eq. (1). Adam performs iterative gradient-
based optimization, based on adaptive estimates of lower-order
moments. Compared to other attacks, such as FGS, the C&W attack
is more time-consuming. However, it is able to find more effective
adversarial examples.
2.2 Existing Defenses
Many approaches have been proposed to help defend against ad-
versarial example. Here we give an overview of some of them.
Adversarial Training. Goodfellow et al. [16] proposed to train a
neural network using both the training dataset and newly generated
adversarial examples. In [16], it is shown that models that have
gone through adversarial training provide some resistance against
adversarial examples generated by the FGS method.
Defensive Distillation. Distillation training was originally pro-
posed by Hinton et al. [18] for the purpose of distilling knowledge
out of a large model (one with many parameters) to train a more
compact model (one with fewer parameters). Given a model whose
knowledge one wants to distill, one applies the model to each in-
stance in the training dataset and generates a probability vector,
which is used as the new label for the instance. This is called the
soft label, because, instead of a single class, the label includes proba-
bilities for different classes. A new model is trained using instances
with soft labels. The intuition is that the probabilities, even those
that are not the largest in a vector, encode valuable knowledge.
To make this knowledge more pronounced, the probability vector
is generated after dividing the logits output with a temperature
constant T > 1. This has the effect of making the smaller probabili-
ties larger and more pronounced. The new model is trained with
the same temperature. However, when deploying the model for
prediction, temperature is set to 1.
Defensive Distillation [27] is motivated by the original distillation
training proposed byHinton et al. [18]. Themain difference between
the two training methods is that defensive distillation uses the same
network architecture for both initial network and distilled network.
This is because the goal of using Distillation here is not to train a
model that has a smaller size, but to train a more robust model.
Dropout. Dropout [30] was introduced to improve generalization
accuracy through the introduction of randomness in training. The
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term “dropout” refers to dropping out units, i.e., temporarily remov-
ing the units along with all its incoming and outgoing connections.
In the simplest case, during each training epoch, each unit is re-
tained with a fixed probability p independent of other units, where
p can be chosen using a validation set or can simply be set to 0.5,
which was suggested by the authors of [30].
There are several intuitions why Dropout is effective in reduc-
ing generalization errors. One is that after applying Dropout, the
model is always trained with a subset of the units in the neural
network. This prevents units from co-adapting too much. That is,
a unit cannot depend on the existence of another unit, and needs
to learn to do something useful on its own. Another intuition is
that training with Dropout approximates simultaneous training
of an exponential number of “thinned” networks. In the original
proposal, dropout is applied in training, but not in testing. During
testing, without applying Dropout, the prediction approximates an
averaging output of all these thinned networks. In Monte Carlo
dropout [14], dropout is also applied in testing. The NN is run multi-
ple times, and the resulting prediction probabilities are averaged for
making prediction. This more directly approximates the behavior
of using the NN as an ensemble of models.
Since Dropout introduces randomness in the training process,
two models that are trained with Dropout are likely to be less
similar than two models that are trained without using Dropout.
Defensive Dropout [37] explicitly uses dropout for defense against
adversarial examples. It applies dropout in testing, but runs the
network just once. In addition, it tunes the dropout rate used in
testing by iteratively generating adversarial examples and choosing
a drop rate to both maximize the testing accuracy and minimize
the attack success rate.
Region-based Classification. Cao and Gong [6] proposed region-
based classification to defend against adversarial examples. Given
an input, region-based classification first generatesm perturbed
inputs by adding bounded random noises to the original input,
then computes a prediction for each perturbed input, and finally
use voting to make the final prediction. This method slows down
prediction by a factor ofm. In [6],m = 10, 000 was used for MNIST
andm = 1, 000was used for CIFAR. Evaluation in [6] shows that this
can withstand adversarial examples generated by the C&W attack
under low confidence value K . However, if one slightly increases
the confidence value K when generating the adversarial examples,
this defense is no longer effective.
MagNet. Meng and Chen [24] proposed an approach that is called
MagNet. MagNet combines two ideas to defend against adversarial
examples. First, one trains detectors that attempt to detect and
reject adversarial examples. Each detector uses an autoencoder,
which is trained to minimize the L2 distance between input image
and output. A threshold is then selected using validation dataset.
The detector rejects any image such that the L2 distance between
it and the encoded image is above the threshold. Multiple detectors
can be used. Second, for each image that passes the detectors, a
reformer (another autoencoder) is applied to the image, and the
output (reformed image) is sent to the classifier for classification.
The evaluation of MagNet in [24] considers only adversarial
examples generated without knowledge of the MagNet defence.
Since one can combine all involved neural networks into a single
one, one can still apply the C&W attack on the composite network.
In [11], an effective attack is carried out against MagNet by adding
to the optimization objective a term describing the goal to evade
the detectors.
3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
We discuss several important factors for evaluation, and introduce
the translucent-box model to supplement white-box evaluation.
3.1 Adversary Knowledge
Adversary model plays an important role in any security evaluation.
One important part of the adversary model is the assumption on
adversary’s knowledge.
Knowledge of Model (white-box). The adversary has full knowl-
edge of the target model to be attacked, including the model ar-
chitecture, defense mechanism, and all the parameters, including
those used in the defense mechanisms. We call such an attack a
white-box attack.
Complete Knowledge of Process (translucent-box). The ad-
versary does not know the exact parameters of the target model, but
knows the training process, including model architecture, defense
mechanism, training algorithm, and distribution of the training
dataset. With this knowledge, the adversary can use the same train-
ing process that is used to generate the target model to train one
or more surrogate models. Depending on the degree of random-
ness involved in the training process, the surrogate models may be
similar or quite different from the target model, and adversarial ex-
amples generated by attacking the surrogate model(s) may or may
not work very well. The property of whether an adversarial exam-
ple generated by attacking one or more surrogate models can also
work against another target model is known as transferability.
We call such an attack a translucent-box attack.
Technically, it is possible for a white-box adversary to know less
than a translucent-box adversary in some aspects. For example, a
white-box adversary may not know the distribution of the training
data. However, for the purpose of generating adversarial examples,
knowing all details of the target model (white-box) is strictly more
powerful than knowing the training process (translucent-box).
Oracle access only (black-box). Some researchers have consid-
ered adversarymodels where an adversary uses only oracle accesses
to the target model. That is, the adversary may be able to query
the target model with instances and receive the output. This is also
called “decision-based adversarial attack” [1, 12]. We call such an
attack a black-box attack.
Some researchers also use black-box attack to refer to what we
call translucent-box attacks.We choose to distinguish translucent-box
attacks from black-box attacks for two reasons. First, an adversary
will have some knowledge about the target model under attack,
e.g., the neural network architecture and the training algorithm.
Thus the box is not really “black”. Second, the two kinds of attacks
are very different. One relies on training surrogate models, and the
other relies on large number of oracle queries.
Other researchers use “black-box attack” to refer to the situation
that the adversary carries out the attack without specifically target-
ing the defense mechanism. We argue that such an evaluation has
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limited values in understanding the security benefits of a defense
mechanism, as it is a clear deviation from the Kerckhoffs’s principle.
Our Choice of Adversary Model.We argue that defense mecha-
nisms should be evaluated under bothwhite-box and translucent-box
attacks. While developing attacks that can generate adversarial ex-
amples using only oracle access is interesting, for a defense mecha-
nism to be effective, one must assume that the adversary cannot
break it even if it has the knowledge of the defense mechanism.
Evaluation under white-box attack can be carried out by mea-
suring the level of distortion needed to attack a model. Effective
defense against white-box attacks is the ultimate objective. Un-
til defense in the white-box model is achieved, effective defense
against translucent-box attacks is valuable and help the research
community make progress. Translucent-box is a realistic assump-
tion especially in an academic setting, as published papers generally
include descriptions of the architecture, training process, defense
mechanisms and the exact dataset used in their experiments. Ro-
bustness and security evaluations under this assumption is also
consistent with the Kerckhoffs’s principle.
We also note that there are two possible flavors of attacks. Fo-
cusing on image classifiers, the goal of an untargeted attack is to
generate adversarial examples such that the classifier would give
any output labels different from what human perception would
classify. A targeted attack would additionally require the working
adversarial examples to induce the classifier into giving specific
output labels of the attacker’s choosing. In this paper, we consider
only targeted attacks when evaluating defense mechanisms, as it
models an adversary with a more specific objective.
3.2 Adversary Strategy
Even after the assumption about the adversary’s knowledge is made,
there are still possibilities regarding what strategy the adversary
takes. For example, when evaluating a defense mechanism under
the translucent-box assumption, a standard method is to trainm
models, and, for each model, generate n adversarial examples. Then
for each of them model, treat it as the target model, and feed the
(m − 1)n adversarial examples generated on other models to it, and
report the percentage of success among them(m − 1)n trials.
Such an evaluation method is assessing the success probability
of the following naive adversary strategy: The adversary trains
one surrogate model, generates an adversarial example that works
against the surrogate model, and then deploy that adversarial exam-
ple.We call this a one-surrogate attack. A real adversary, however,
can use a more effective strategy. It can try to generate adversar-
ial examples that can fool multiple surrogate models at the same
time. After generating them, it can first test whether the adver-
sarial examples can fool surrogate models that are not used in the
generation. We call this amulti-surrogate attack.
For any defense mechanism that is more effective against ad-
versarial examples under the translucent-box attack than under
the white-box model, the additional effectiveness must be due to
the randomness in the training process. When that is the case, the
above adversary strategy would have much higher success rate than
the naive adversary strategy. Evaluation should be done against
this adversary strategy.
We thus propose the following procedure for evaluating a de-
fense mechanism in a translucent-box attack. One first trains t +v
surrogate models. Then a set of t models are randomly selected,
and adversarial examples are generated that can simultaneously
attack all t of them; that is, the optimization objective of the attack
includes all t models. For the remaining v models, we use leave-
one-out validation. That is, for each model, we use v − 1 model as
validationmodels, and select only adversarial examples that can fool
a certain fraction of the validation models. Only for the examples
that pass this validation stage, do we record whether it success-
fully transfer to the target model or not. We call such an attack a
multi-surrogate with validation attack. The percentage of the
successful transfer is used for evaluation. In our experiments, we
use t = v = 8, and an example is selected when it can successfully
attack at least 5 out of 7 validation models.
3.3 Parameters and Data Interpretation
Training a defense mechanism often requires multiple parameters
as inputs. For example, a defense mechanism may be tuned to be
more vigilant against adversarial examples, at the cost of reduced
classification accuracy. When comparing defense mechanisms, one
should choose parameters in a way that the classification accuracy
on test dataset is similar.
At the same time, when using the C&W attack to generate ad-
versarial examples, an important parameter is the confidence value
K . A defense mechanism may be able to resist adversarial examples
generated under a low K value, but may prove much less effective
against those generated under a higher value K (see, e.g., [6]). Us-
ing the same K value for different defenses, however, may not be
sufficient for providing a level playfield of comparison. The K value
represents inputs into the algorithm, and what really matters are
the quality of the adversarial examples. We propose to run the C&W
attack against a defense mechanism under multiple K values, and
group the resulting adversarial examples based on their distortion.
We can then compare how well a defense mechanism performs
adversarial examples with similar amount of distortion. That is, we
group adversarial examples based on the L2 distance and compute
the average transferability for each group.
4 PROPOSED DEFENSE
From a statistical point of view, the problem with adversarial exam-
ples is that of classification under covariate shifts [29]. A covariate
shift happens when the training and test observations follow differ-
ent distributions. In the case of adversarial examples, this is clearly
the case, as new adversarial examples are generated and added to
the test distribution. If the test distribution with adversarial ex-
amples can be known, a simple and optimal way for dealing with
covariate shifts is training the model with samples from the test dis-
tribution, rather than using the original training data [17, 29, 31, 32],
assuming that we have access to enough such examples. Training
with adversarial examples can be viewed as a robust optimization
procedure [23] approximating this approach.
Unfortunately, training with adversarial examples does not fully
solve the defense problem. Adversaries can adapt the test distri-
bution (a new covariate shift) to make the new classifier perform
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poorly again on test data. That is, given a model trained with ad-
versarial examples, the adversary can find additional adversarial
examples and use them. In this minimax game, where the adversary
is looking for a covariate shift and the defender is training with
the latest covariate shift, the odds are stacked against the defender,
who is always one step behind the attacker [34, 42].
Fundamentally, to win this game, the defender needs to mimic
human perception. That is, as long as there are instances (real or
fabricated) where humans and ML models classify differently, these
can be over represented in the test data by the adversary’s covariate
shift. Models that either underfit or overfit both make mistakes
by definition, and these mistakes can be used in the adversary’s
covariate shift. Only a model with no training or generalization
errors under all covariate shifts are not vulnerable to attacks.
4.1 Motivation of Our Approach
While it is impossible to completely eliminate classification errors,
several things can be done to help defend against adversarial exam-
ples by making them harder to find.
One approach is to reduce the number of instances that the ML
models disagree with human perception. Training with adversarial
examples help in this regard. Using more robust model architecture
and training procedure can also help. When giving an image to
train the model, intuitively we want to say that “all instances that
look similar to this instance from a human’s perspective should also
have the same label”. Unfortunately, finding which images humans
will consider to be “similar to this instace” and thus should be of
the same class is not a well-defined procedure. Today, the best we
can hope for is that for some mathematical distance measure (such
as L2 distance) and with a smaller enough threshold, humans will
consider the images to be similar. If we substitute “look similar to
... from a human’s perspective” with “within a certain L2 distance”,
this is a precise statement. This suggests that one training instance
should be interpreted as a set of instances (e.g., those within a
certain L2 distance of the given one) all have the same given label.
Our proposed defense is to some extent motivated by this intuition.
Another way is to make it more difficult for adversaries to dis-
cover adversarial examples, even if they exist. One approach is
to use an ensemble model, wherein multiple models are trained
and applied to an instance and the results are aggregated in some
fashion. For an adversarial example to work, it must be able to fool
a majority of the models in the ensemble.
If we consider defense in the translucent box adversary model,
another approach is to increase the degree of randomness in the
training process, so that adversarial examples generated on the
surrogate models do not transfer well.
Our proposed new defense against adversarial examples are moti-
vated by these ideas, which are recapped below. First, each training
instance should be viewed as representatives of instances within
a certain L2 distance. Second, we want to increase the degree of
randomness in the training process. Third, we want to approximate
the usage of an ensemble of models for decision.
4.2 Random Spiking
As discussed in Section 2.2, dropout has been proposed as a way to
defense against adversarial examples. Dropout can be interpreted
as a way of regularizing a neural network by adding noise to its
hidden units. The idea of adding noise to the states of units has
also been used in the context of Denoising Autoencoders (DAEs)
by Vincent et al. [35, 36], where noise is added to the input units
of an autoencoder and the network is trained to reconstruct the
noise-free input. Dropout changes the behavior of the hidden units.
Furthermore, instead of adding random noises, in Dropout, values
are set to zero.
Our proposed approach generalizes both Dropout and Denoising
Autoencoders. Instead of training with removed units or injecting
random noises into the input units, we inject random activations
into some hidden units near the input level. We this method Ran-
dom Spiking. Similar to dropout, there are two approaches at
inference time. The first is to use random spiking only in training,
and does not use it at inference time. The second is to use a Monte
Carlo decision procedure. That is, at decision time, one runs the
NN multiple times, with random spiking, and aggregate the result
into one decision.
The motivations for random spiking are many-fold. First, we are
simulating the interpretation that each training instance should be
treated as a set of instances, eachwith some small changes. Injecting
random perturbations in a level near the input simulates the effect of
training with a set of instances. Second, adversarial examples make
only small perturbations on benign images that do not significantly
affect human perception. These perturbations inject noises that
will be amplified through multiple layers and change the prediction
of the networks. Random Spiking trains the network to be more
robust to such noises. Third, if one needs to increase the degree of
randomness in the training process beyond Dropout, using random
noises instead of setting activations to zero is a natural approach.
Fourth, when we use the Monte Carlo decision procedure, we are
approximating the behavior of a model ensemble.
More specifically, random spiking adds a filtering layer in be-
tween two layers of nodes in a DNN. The effect of the filtering
layer may change the output values of units in the earlier layer,
affecting the values going into the later layer. With probability p, a
unit’s value is kept unchanged. With probability 1−p, a unit’s value
is set to a randomly sampled noise. If a unit has its output value
thus randomly perturbed, in back-propagation we do not propagate
backward through this unit, since any gradient computed is related
to the random noise, and not the actual behavior of this unit. For
layers after the Random Spiking filtering layer, back-propagation
update would occur normally.
We use the Random Spiking filtering layer just once, after the
first convolutional layer (and before any max pooling layer if one is
used). This is justified by the design intuition.We also experimented
with adding the Random Spiking filtering layer later in the NN, and
test accuracy drops. There are two explanations for that. First, since
units chosen to have random noises stop back-propagation, having
them later in the network has more impact on training. Second,
when random noises are injected early in the network, there are
more layers after it, and there is sufficient capacity in the model
to deal with such noises without too much accuracy cost. When
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random noises are injected late, fewer layers exist to deal with their
effect, and the network lacks the capacity to do so.
Generating Random Noises. To implement Random Spiking, we
have to decide how to sample the noises that are to be used to
replace the unit outputs. Sampling from a distribution with a fixed
range is problematic because the impact of noise depends on the
distribution of other values in the same layer. If a random pertur-
bation is too small compared to other values in the same layer,
then its randomization effect is too small. If, on the other hand,
the magnitude of the noise is significantly larger than the other
values, it overwhelms the network. In our approach, we compute
the minimum and maximum value among all values in the layers to
be filtered, and sample a value uniformly at random in that range.
Since training NN is often done using mini-batches, the minimum
and maximum values are computed from the whole batch.
Monte Carlo Random Spiking as a Model Ensemble. For test-
ing, we can use the Monte Carlo decision procedure of running the
network multiple times and use the average. This has attractive
theoretical guarantees, at the cost of overhead for decision time,
since the NN needs to be computed multiple times for one instance.
We now show that the Monte Carlo Random Spiking approximates
a model ensemble. Let (x ,y) be a training example, where x is an
image and y is the image’s one-hot encoded label. Consider a RS
neural network with softmax output yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W ), neuron weights
W , and spike parameters b and ϵ , where bit vector bi = 1 indicates
that the i-th hidden neuron of the RS layer gives out a noise output
ϵi ∈ R sampled with density f (ϵ), otherwise bi = 0 and the out-
put is of the RS layer is a copy of its i-th input from the previous
layer (i.e., the original value of the neuron). By construction, bi = 1
with probability p independent of other RS neurons. Let L(y, yˆ) be a
convex loss function over yˆ, such as the cross-entropy loss, the neg-
ative log-likelihood, or the square error loss. Then, the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 1. Consider the ensemble RS model
yˆ(x ,W ) ≡
∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W )p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ , (2)
where f is a density function, p(b) is the probability that bit vector b
is sampled, and yˆ is a RS neural network with one spike layer. Then,
by stochastically optimizing the original RS neural network yˆ by
sampling bit vectors and noises, we are performing the minimization
W⋆ = argmin
W
L(y, yˆ(x ,W ))
through a variational approximation model using an upper bound of
the loss L(y, yˆ(x ,W )). A proof of Prop. 1 is presented in Appendix A.2.
Definition 2 (MCAvg. Inference). At inference time, we useMonte
Carlo sampling to estimate the RS ensemble
yˆ(x ,W ) =
∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W )p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ,
where f is a density function, p(b) is the probability that bit vector
b is sampled.
Adaptive Attack against Random Spiking. Since Random Spik-
ing introduces randomness during training, an adaptive attacker
knowing that Random Spiking has been deployed but is unaware
Table 1: Overview of datasets
Dataset Image size TrainingInstances
Test
Instances
Color
space
MNIST 28 × 28 60,000 10,000 8-bits Gray-scale
Fashion-MNIST 28 × 28 60,000 10,000 8-bits Gray-scale
CIFAR-10 32 × 32 50,000 10,000 24-bits True-Color
of the exact parameters of the target model can train multiple sur-
rogate models, and try to generate adversarial examples that can
simultaneously cause all these models to misbehave. That is, the
multi-surrogate with validation is a natural adaptive attack against
Random Spiking, and any other defense mechanisms that rely on
randomness during training. In this attack, one uses probabilities
from all surrogate models to generate the adversarial example. This
is similar to the Expectation over Transformation (EOT) [3] ap-
proach for generating adversarial examples.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We present experimental results comparing the various defense
mechanisms using our proposed approach.
5.1 Dataset and Model Training
For our experiments, we use the following 3 datasets: MNIST [21],
Fashion-MNIST [38], and CIFAR-10 [20]. Table 1 gives an overview
of their characteristics.
We consider 9 schemes equipped with different defense mecha-
nisms, all of which share the the same network architectures and
training parameters. For MNIST, we follow the architecture given
in the C&W paper [9]. Fashion-MNIST was not studied in the liter-
ature in an adversarial setting, and the model architectures used
for CIFAR-10 in previous papers delivered a fairly low accuracy.
Thus for Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, we use the state-of-the-art
WRN-28-10 instantiation of the wide residual networks [41]. We
are able to achieve state-of-the-art test accuracy using these archi-
tectures. Some of these mechanisms have adjustable parameters,
and we choose values for these parameters so that the resulting
models have a comparable level of accuracy on the testing data. As
the result, all 9 schemes result in small accuracy drop.
Table 2 gives the test errors, and Tables 6 and 7 in the Appen-
dix give details of the model architecture, and training parameters.
When a scheme uses either Dropout or Random Spiking, we con-
sider 3 possible decision procedures at test time. By “Single pred.”,
we mean dropout and random spiking are not used at test time.
By “Voting”, we mean running the network with Dropout and/or
Random Spiking 10 times, and use majority voting for decision
(with ties decided in favor of the label with smaller index). By “MC
Avg.”, we mean using Definition 2 by running the network with
Dropout and/or Random Spiking 10 times, and averaging the 10
probability vectors. For each scheme, we train 16 models (with
different initial parameter values) on each dataset, and report the
mean and standard deviation of their test accuracy. We observe
that using Voting or MC Avg, one can typically achieve a slight
reduction in test error.
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Table 2: Test errors (mean±std).
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Standard Single pred. 0.77 ± 0.05% 4.94 ± 0.19% 4.38 ± 0.21%
Dropout MC Avg. 0.67 ± 0.07% 4.75 ± 0.09% 4.46 ± 0.25%
Distillation MC Avg. 0.78 ± 0.05% 4.81 ± 0.18% 4.33 ± 0.27%
RS-1 MC Avg. 0.88 ± 0.09% 5.34 ± 0.10% 5.59 ± 0.22%
RS-1-Dropout MC Avg. 0.71 ± 0.07% 5.32 ± 0.17% 5.81 ± 0.27%
RS-1-Adv MC Avg. 0.98 ± 0.11% 5.49 ± 0.16% 6.20 ± 0.40%
Magnet Det. Thrs. 0.001 0.004 0.004
MC Avg. 0.87 ± 0.06% 5.36 ± 0.17% 5.52 ± 0.24%
Dropout-Adv MC Avg. 0.69 ± 0.07% 4.76 ± 0.11% 4.71 ± 0.19%
RC L2 noise 0.4 0.02 0.02
Voting 0.77 ± 0.11% 5.39 ± 0.23% 5.72 ± 0.46%
Table 3: Parameters used for generating adversarial exam-
ples. The values for K reported here were chosen so that the
generated examples would fit a predetermined L2 cut-off.
Dataset L2cut-off
Working confidence
values (K)
Examples for
each K (n)
MNIST 3.0 {0, 5, 10, 15} 3000
Fashion-MNIST 1.0 {0, 20, 40, 60} 3000
CIFAR-10 1.0 {0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100} 2000
5.1.1 Adversarial training. Two defense mechanisms require
training with adversarial examples, which are generated by apply-
ing the C&W L2 targeted attack on a target model, using randomly
sampled training instances and target classes.
Upper Bounds on Perturbation. For each dataset, we generated
thousands of adversarial examples with varying confidence values
for each training scheme, and have them sorted according to the
added amount of perturbation, measured in L2. We have observed
that from instances that have high amount of perturbation one
can visually observe the intention of adversarial example. We thus
chose a cut-off upper bound on L2 distance. The chosen L2 cut-off
bounds are included in Table 3, and used as upper limits in many
of our later experiments. With the bounds on L2 fixed, we then
empirically determine an upper bound for the confidence value to
be used in the C&W-L2 attacks for generating adversarial examples
for training purposes. To diversify the set of generated adversarial
examples, we sample several different confidence values within the
bound, which are also reported in Table 3.
Appendix A.1 provides additional details on training for each
defense scheme.
5.2 White-box Evaluation
We first evaluate the effectiveness of the defense mechanisms under
white-box attacks. We apply the C&W white-box attack with con-
fidence 0 to generate targeted adversarial examples, and measure
the L2. distance of the generated adversarial examples. We consider
both single-model attack, where the adversarial example targets a
single model, and multi-8 attack, where the adversarial example
aims at attacking 8 similarly trained model at the same time. This
can be considered as a form of ensemble white-box attack [22].
Table 4: C&W targeted Adv Examples L2 (mean±std) when
attacking a single model.
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Standard 2.12 ± 0.69 0.12 ± 0.08 0.17 ± 0.08
Dropout 1.80 ± 0.52 0.14 ± 0.07 0.17 ± 0.08
Distillation 2.02 ± 0.63 0.13 ± 0.07 0.17 ± 0.07
RS-1 2.06 ± 0.76 0.31 ± 0.16 0.32 ± 0.14
RS-1-Dropout 1.79 ± 0.86 0.36 ± 0.21 0.32 ± 0.15
RS-1-Adv 2.36 ± 0.80 0.56 ± 0.30 0.39 ± 0.18
Magnet 2.22 ± 0.65 0.28 ± 0.15 0.29 ± 0.21
Dropout-Adv 2.44 ± 0.66 0.33 ± 0.15 0.18 ± 0.07
Table 5: C&W Adv Examples L2 (mean±std) withMulti 8 at-
tack strategy.
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Standard 2.50 ± 0.77 0.22 ± 0.15 0.25 ± 0.10
Dropout 2.29 ± 0.65 0.25 ± 0.13 0.26 ± 0.10
Distillation 2.37 ± 0.71 0.24 ± 0.14 0.33 ± 0.13
RS-1 2.77 ± 0.82 0.54 ± 0.25 0.49 ± 0.18
RS-1-Dropout 2.77 ± 0.93 0.61 ± 0.30 0.51 ± 0.18
RS-1-Adv 3.18 ± 0.88 1.04 ± 0.44 0.64 ± 0.23
Magnet 2.68 ± 0.75 0.54 ± 0.25 0.47 ± 0.24
Dropout-Adv 2.93 ± 0.70 0.57 ± 0.23 0.29 ± 0.10
Tables 4 and 5 present the average L2 distances of the gener-
ated examples for those generated adversarial examples. RS-1-Adv
results in models that are more difficult to attack, requires on av-
erage the highest perturbations (measured in L2 distance) among
all evaluated defenses. Comparing to other methods, adversarial
examples generated by RS-1 and RS-1-Dropout have either higher
or comparable amount of distortion. These again suggest RS offers
additional protection against adversarial examples.
5.3 Model Stability
Given a benign image and its variants with added noise, a more
robust model should intuitively be able to tolerate a higher level
of noise without changing its prediction results. We refer to this
property as model stability. Here we evaluate whether models from
a defense mechanism can correct label instances that are perturbed.
This serves several purposes. First, in [15], it is suggested that
vulnerability to adversarial examples and low performance on ran-
domly corrupted images, such as images with additive Gaussian
noise, are two manifestations of the same underlying phenome-
non. Hence it is suggested that adversary defenses should consider
robustness under such perturbations, as robustness under such
perturbations are also indications of resistance against adversary
attacks. Second, evaluating stability is identified in [2, 7] as a way to
check whether a defense relies on obfuscated gradients to achieve
its defense. For such a defense, random perturbation may discover
adversarial examples when optimized search based on gradients
fail. Third, some defense mechanisms (such as Magnet) rely on de-
tecting whether an instance belongs to the same distribution as the
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Figure 1: Evaluating model stability with Gaussian Noise
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Figure 2: Evaluating model stability with JPEG compression
training set, and consider an instance to be an adversarial example
if it does. However, when an input instance goes through some
transformation that has little impact on human visual detection
(such as JPEG compression), it will be considered as an adversarial
example by the defense. This will impact accuracy of deployed
systems, as the encountered instances may not always follow the
training distribution.
5.3.1 Stability with Added Gaussian Noise. We measure how many
predictions would change if a certain amount of Gaussian noise
is introduced to a set of benign images. For a given dataset and a
model, we use the first 1, 000 images from the test dataset. We first
make a prediction on those selected images and store the results as
reference predictions. Then, for each selected image and chosen L2
distance, we sample Gaussian noise, scale it to the desired L2 value,
and add the noise to the image. Pixel values are clipped if necessary,
to make sure the new noisy variant is a valid image. We repeat this
process 20 times (noise sampled independently per iteration).
Fig. 1 shows the effect of Gaussian noise on prediction stability
for each training method (averaged over the 16 models trained in
Sec. 5.1). Model stability inevitably drops for each scheme as the
amount of Gaussian noise as measured by L2 increases. However,
different schemes behave differently when L2 increases.
For MNIST, most schemes have stability above 99%, even when
L2 is as large as 5. However, Magnet has stability approaching 0
when the L2 distance is greater than 1, because majority of those
instances are rejected by Magnet.
For Fashion-MNIST, we see more interesting differences among
the schemes. The two approaches that have highest stability are
the two with adversarial training. When L2 = 2.5, RS-1-ADV has
stability 87.4%, and ADV has stability 86%. Other schemes have
stability around 60%; among them, RS-1 and RSD-1 have slightly
higher stability than others.
For CIFAR-10, we see that RS-1-ADV, RSD-1, and RS-1 have
the highest stability as the amount of noise increases. When L2 =
2.5, they have stability 87.9%, 81.7%, 83%, respectively. The other
schemes have stability 70% or lower.
Furthermore, on all datasets, RS-1-ADV, RSD-1, and RS-1 give
consistent results. Recall that we trained 16 models for each scheme,
Fig. 1 also plots the standard deviation of the stability result of the
16 models. RS-1-ADV, RSD-1, and RS-1 have very low standard
deviation, which in turn also suggest more consistent behavior
when facing perturbed images.
5.3.2 Stability with JPEG compression. Given a set of benign im-
ages, we measure how many predictions would change if JPEG
compression is applied to images. For a given test dataset and a
model, we compare the prediction on the benign test dataset (ref-
erence predictions) with the prediction on JPEG compressed test
dataset with a fixed chosen JPEG compression quality (JCQ). For
the sake of time efficiency, for this particular set of experiments,
we reduced the number of iterations used by RC to one-tenth of its
original algorithm.
Fig. 2 shows the effect of JPEG compression on prediction stabil-
ity for each training method (averaged over the 16 models trained).
Model stability decreases for each scheme as the JCQ (ranges 10 −
100) decreases.
For MNIST, most schemes achieve stability over 99, even if the
JCQ is 10. Magnet is the outlier, which has a stability of around 50
when the JCQ is 70, and has a stability of less than 20% when the
JCQ is less than or equal to 40, because of the high rejection rate
of MagNet. We believe that both of these results are related to the
fact that MNIST images have black backgrounds that span most of
the image. Noises introduced by JPEG compression result mostly
in perturbations in the background that are ignored by most NN
models. Since Magnet uses autoencoders to detect deviations from
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the input distributions, these noises trigger the detection. Since
Magnet aims at detecting perturbed images, this should not be
considered as a weakness of Magnet.
For Fashion-MNIST, we see that RS-1-ADV, RSD-1, and RS-1
outperform other schemes on the stability as the JCQ decreases.
When JCQ = 10, they have stability 85.2%, 80.9%, 84.4%, respectively.
The other schemes have stability 80% or lower; The closest to the
RS-class among other schemes is ADV.
For CIFAR-10, we see that RS-1-ADV, RSD-1, and RS-1 have the
highest stability as the JCQ decreases. When JCQ = 10, they have
stability 60.9%, 55.6%, 55.4%, respectively. The other schemes have
stability 50% or lower; the highest among the other schemes is RC.
5.4 Evaluating Attack Strategies
Here we empirically show that our proposed attack strategy, as
presented in Sec. 3.2, can indeed generate adversarial examples
that are more transferable. In attacks like the C&W attack, a higher
confidence value will typically lead to more transferable examples,
but the amount of perturbation would usually increase as well,
sometimes making the example noticeably different under human
perception.
Intuitively, a better attack strategy should give more transferable
adversarial examples using less amount of distortion. Hence we
use Distortion vs Transferability to compare 3 possible attack strate-
gies. Similar to previous experiments, we measure the amount of
distortion using L2 distance. In Fig. 3 we present the effectiveness
of each attack strategy, averaged across the 9 schemes.
The first strategy we evaluated is a standard C&W attack which
generates adversarial examples using only one surrogate model,
dubbed ‘Single’. Recall that for each training/defense method, we
have 16models that are surrogates of each other (Sec. 5.1). For each
surrogate model, we randomly select half of the original dataset as
the training dataset, since the adversary may not have full knowl-
edge of the training dataset under the transfer attack setting. For
the Single strategy, we apply the C&W attack on 4 of the models
independently to generate a pool of adversarial examples. The trans-
ferability of those examples are then measured and averaged on the
remaining 12 target models. Regardless of the training methods and
defense mechanisms in place, adversarial examples generated us-
ing the Single strategy often have limited transferability, especially
when the allowed amount of distortion (L2 distance) is small.
The second attack strategy that we evaluate is to generate ad-
versarial examples using multiple surrogate models. For this, we
use 8 of the 16 surrogate models for generating attack examples.
The C&W attack can be adapted to handle this case with a slightly
different loss function. In our experiments, we use the sum of the
loss functions of the 8 surrogate models as the new loss function.
We also use slightly lower confidence values than in Sec. 5.1.1
({0, 10, 20, 30} for Fashion-MNIST, {0, 20, 40, 60} CIFAR-10). The
transferability of the generated adversarial examples are then mea-
sured and averaged on the remaining 8 models as the target. We
refer to this as ‘Multi 8’. As shown in Fig. 3, given the same limit
on the amount of distortion (L2 distance), a significantly higher
percentage of examples generated using the Multi 8 strategy are
transferable than those found using the Single strategy.
Additionally, we evaluate a third attack strategy that is based
on Multi 8. As discussed in Sec. 3.2, given enough surrogate mod-
els, one can further use some of them for validating adversarial
examples. For those adversarial examples generated by the Multi 8
strategy, we keep them only if they can be transferred to at least 5
of the 7 validation models, hence we refer to this strategy Multi 8
& Passing 5/7 Validation. The remaining model is used as the attack
target, and we measure the transferability of examples that passed
the 5/7 Validation. For this attack strategy, the measurements shown
in Fig. 3 is the average of 8 rotations between target model and
validation models. Comparing to Multi 8 and Single, adversarial ex-
amples that passed the 5/7 Validation are significantly more likely to
transfer to the target model, even when the amount of perturbation
is small.
This shows that simple strategies like Single are indeed not real-
izing the full potential of a resourceful attacker, and our proposed
attack strategy of using multiple models for the generation and
validation of adversarial examples is indeed superior. In the reset
of this section, we will be using the most effective attack strategy
of Multi 8 & Passing 5/7 Validation.
5.5 Translucent-box Evaluation
Here we evaluate the effectiveness of different schemes based on the
transferability of adversarial examples generated using the Multi 8
& Passing 5/7 Validation attack strategy.
The results of our translucent-box evaluation are shown in Fig. 4.
Adversarial examples are grouped into buckets based on their L2
distance. For each bucket, we use grayscale to indicate the aver-
age validation passing rate for each scheme. Passing rate from 0%
to 100% are mapped to pixel value from 0 to 255 in a linear scale.
There are four rows, each correspond to adversarial examples with a
certain L2 range. Each column illustrates to what extent a target de-
fense scheme resist adversarial examples generated from attacking
different methods.
Examining the columns for Standard and Dropout, we can see
that Standard and Dropout are in general most vulnerable. Distilla-
tion and RC are almost equally vulnerable. Magnet can often resist
adversarial examples generated by targeting other defenses, but are
vulnerable to ones generated specifically targeting it.
Overall, across the three datasets, RS-1-Adv performs the best,
and is significantly better than Dropout-Adv. This suggests that
Random Spiking offers additional protection against adversarial
examples. RS-1 and RS-1-Dropout also perform consistently well
across the three datasets. RC performs noticeably well on MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST, likely because the images were all in 8-bit
grayscale, and its advantages diminish on CIFAR-10 which contains
images of 24-bit color.
6 RELATEDWORK
Other attack algorithms. There are other attack algorithms such
as JSMA [26], FGS [16], and DeepFool [25]. The general consensus
seems to be that the C&W attack is the current state-of-the-art
[8, 9, 13]. Though our evaluation results are based on the C&W
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Figure 3: Transferability of adversarial examples found by the 3 attack strategies
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Figure 4: Average passing rate of 5/7 validation
This heat map shows the resilience of each scheme against the adversarial examples generated from all schemes, under a fixed allowance of
L2. Each column illustrates to what extent a target defense scheme resists adversarial examples generated from attacking different methods.
attack, our evaluation is not tied to a particular attack and can use
other algorithms.
Other defense mechanisms. Some other defense mechanisms
have been proposed [6, 24, 27, 39, 40] in the literature. For example,
Xu et al.. proposed to use feature squeezing techniques such as
color bit depths reduction and pixel spatial smoothing to detect ad-
versarial examples [40]. Due to limit in time and space, we selected
representative methods from each broad class (e.g., MagNet for the
detection approach). We leave comparison with other mechanisms
as future work.
Beyond images. Other research efforts have explored possible at-
tacks against neural network models specialized for other purposes,
for example, speech to text [10]. We focus on images, although the
evaluation methodology and the idea of random spiking should be
applicable to these other domains.
Alternative similarity metrics. Some researchers have argued
that Lp norms insufficiently capture human perception, and have
proposed alternative similarity metrics like SSIM [28]. It is however,
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not immediately clear how to adapt such metrics in the C&W at-
tack. We leave further investigations on the impacts of alternative
similarity metrics on adversarial examples for future work.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a careful analysis of possible adversar-
ial models for studying the phenomenon of adversarial examples.
We propose an evaluation methodology that can better illustrate
the strengths and limitations of different mechanisms. As part of
the method, we introduce a more powerful and meaningful adver-
sary strategy. We also introduced Random Spiking, a randomized
technique that generalizes dropout. We have conducted extensive
evaluation of Random Spiking and several other defense mech-
anisms, and demonstrate that Random Spiking, especially when
combined with adversarial training, offers better protection against
adversarial examples when compared with other existing defenses.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 More Information on Training
Model architecture and training parameters are in Tables 6 and 7.
ForMNIST, we use the same as inMagNet [9, 24]). For Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR-10, they are identical to the WRN [41]. Test errors of the
nine schemes are in Table 2. For each scheme and dataset, we train
16 models and report the mean and standard deviation. Additional
information is provided below.
Table 6: Mode Architectures. We use WRN-28-10 for
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 (k = 10,N = 4).
MNIST Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Group OutputSize Kernel, Feature
Output
Size Kernel, Feature
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 32 Conv1 28 × 28 [3 × 3, 16] 32 × 32 [3 × 3, 16]
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 32
Conv2 28 × 28
[
3 × 3, 16 × k
3 × 3, 16 × k
]
× N 32 × 32
[
3 × 3, 16 × k
3 × 3, 16 × k
]
× NMax Pooling 2 × 2
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 64
Conv.ReLU 3 × 3 × 64
Conv3 14 × 14
[
3 × 3, 32 × k
3 × 3, 32 × k
]
× N 16 × 16
[
3 × 3, 32 × k
3 × 3, 32 × k
]
× NMax Pooling 2 × 2
Dense.ReLU 200
Dense.ReLU 200 Conv4 7 × 7
[
3 × 3, 64 × k
3 × 3, 64 × k
]
× N 8 × 8
[
3 × 3, 64 × k
3 × 3, 64 × k
]
× N
Softmax 10 Softmax 10 10
Table 7: Training Parameters.
Parameters MNIST Fashion-MNIST & CIFAR-10
Optimization Method SGD SGD
Learning Rate 0.01 0.1 initial, multiply by 0.2
at 60, 120 and 160 epochs
Momentum 0.9 0.9
Batch Size 128 128
Epochs 50 200
Dropout (Optional) 0.5 0.1
Data Augmentation - Fashion-MNIST: Shifting + Horizontal Flip
CIFAR-10: Shifting + Rotation +
Horizontal Flip + Zooming + Shear
Magnet.We use the trainedDropout model as the prediction model,
and train theMagnet defensivemodels (reformers and detectors) [24]
based on the publicly released Magnet implementation1. Identical
to the settings2 presented in the original Magnet paper [24], for
MNIST, we use Reformer I, Detector I/L2 and Detector II/L1, with
detection threshold set to 0.001. Since Fashion-MNIST was not
studied in [24], we use the same model architecture as CIFAR-10
presented in the original Magnet paper [24]. For Fashion-MNIST
and CIFAR-10, we use Reformer II, Detector II/L1, Detector II/T10
1https://github.com/Trevillie/MagNet
2Regarding the Detector settings, a small discrepancy exists between the paper and
the released source code. After confirming with the authors, we follow what is given
by the source code.
and Detector II/T40, and with a detection threshold (rate of false
positive) of 0.004, which results in test error rates comparable to
those of the other schemes.
Random Spiking with standard model (RS-1). A Random Spik-
ing (RS) layer is added after the first convolution layer in the stan-
dard architecture. We choose p = 0.8, so that 20% of all neuron
outputs are randomly spiked.
Random Spiking with Dropout (RS-1-Dropout). We add the
RS layer to the Dropout scheme. All other parameters are identical
to what we used for RS-1.
Distillation.We use the same network architecture and parame-
ters as we did for the training of Dropout models. Identical to the
configuration used in [9], we train with temperature T = 100 and
test with T = 1 for all three datasets.
Region-based Classification (RC).We use the Dropout models
for RC. For each test example, we generate t additional examples,
where for each pixel, a noise was randomly chosen from (−r , r )
and added to it. Prediction is then made with majority voting on
the t input examples. Identical to the original RC paper [6], we use
t = 10, 000 for MNIST and t = 1, 000 for CIFAR-10. We also use
t = 1, 000 for Fashion-MNIST. We choose values for r (r = 0.4 for
MNIST, and r = 0.02 for Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10) so that the
test errors would be comparable to the other mechanisms.
Adversarial Dropout (Dropout-Adv).To use adversarial training
withDropout, we leverage the trained Dropout model from before as
the target model for generating adversarial examples. We generated
12, 000 adversarial examples for each Dropout model by perturbing
training instances. To ensure that the adversarial examples indeed
should be classified under the original label, we sort the adversarial
examples according to their L2 distances in ascending order, and
add only the first 10, 000 examples into the training dataset. These
examples have L2 distances lower than the cutoff mentioned earlier.
We then apply the Dropout training procedure as described before
on the new training dataset.
Adversarial Random Spiking (RS-1-Adv). For this adversarial
training method, we use RS-1 as the target model. The training pa-
rameters and procedure are largely identical to what were described
for Dropout-Adv above.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof sketch. TheMonte Carlo sampling used in the RS neural
network optimization gives an unbiased estimate of the gradient∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
∂
∂W
L (y, yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W ))p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ
=
∂
∂W
∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
L (y, yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W ))p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ ,
with the above equality given by the linearity of the expectation
and integral operators. That is, the RS neural network optimization
is a Robbins-Monro stochastic optimization [5] that minimizes
W ′ = argmin
W
∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
L(y, yˆ(x ,W ))p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ .
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L is convex on yˆ, then by Jensen’s inequality∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
L (y, yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W ))p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ ≥
L
(
y,
∑
∀b
∫
ϵ
yˆ(x ,b,ϵ ,W )p(b)f (ϵ)dϵ
)
≡ L
(
y, yˆ(x ,W )
)
.
Thus, the RS neural network minimizes an upper bound of the loss
of the ensemble RS model yˆ(x ,W ), yielding a proper variational
inference procedure [4]. □
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